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eorg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) was a post-
Kantian German Idealist who sought to elaborate a 
“comprehensive and systematic ontology from a logi-
cal starting point” and is perhaps most well known 
for his “teleological account of history.”1 In 1807, Hegel pub-
lished his most important philosophical work, The Phenomenology 
of Spirit. Despite its age, the Phenomenology is a text that is still 
widely read, cited, and discussed. While arguably the greatest 
attention has been paid to Hegel’s presentation of the master-
slave dialectic in the work, there are many other important as-
pects of the text that should be focused on in a critical light. I ar-
gue that Hegel’s gendered conception of family life and civil life 
in The Phenomenology of Spirit, as well as how Hegel articulates a 
gendered division of labor through these concepts, call for care-
ful critical examination. It is important to draw attention to how 
Hegel conceives of gender difference and the public-private dis-
tinction, given the influential role that this text has played in 
feminist analysis and scholarship.  
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 Varying interpretations of the Phenomenology have led to 
divergent feminist readings of the work and different subsequent 
uses of the text—it has served as both a source of feminist criti-
cism and also as a source of inspiration for more positive applica-
tions to feminist works. I contend that Hegel should be interpret-
ed as presenting a stereotypical (and patriarchal) account of gen-
der in his section on “Spirit: The True Spirit, The Ethical Order,” 
specifically through his analysis of Sophocles’ play Antigone, 
which lends itself productively to feminist critique. However, 
despite this critical account, I additionally argue that Hegel’s sec-
tion on Spirit offers a valuable point of analysis for feminist 
scholars, despite the problematic gender distinctions Hegel pre-
sents, and that Hegel’s work can still be beneficial to feminist 
pursuits. 
 Hegel begins to formulate gendered divisions of labor 
and responsibility in the “Ethical Order” subsection of The Phe-
nomenology of Spirit. In his discussion of Spirit, Hegel describes 
a community of individuals bound together by law, and how 
these individuals structure themselves and relate to one another. 
Here, Hegel is expanding on a conception of “the Ethical Life,” 
which can be found in several of Hegel’s early lectures and in 
unpublished manuscripts for The System of Ethical Life (1802-3) 
and First Philosophy of Spirit (1803-4). 2 H.S Harris highlights some 
of the central aspects of Hegel’s early articulations of the Ethical 
Nature, including the community as the basis for an ethical life 
based in relation, and the early distinctions between the natural 
community, that of the family, and the wider community beyond 
the family. 3 
Hegel’s concept of “the Ethical Life” is also expanded in 
works published after the Phenomenology, especially the Elements 
of the Philosophy of Right (1920). In Allen Wood’s introduction to 
Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, he examines some aspects of what 
Hegel takes to be “the Ethical Life.” Wood describes Hegel’s de-
velopment of a concept of a civil society in this latter text, which 
he differentiates from both the family and the state. In examining 
the distinction between the civil life and state and family life, 
Wood describes Hegel’s conception of the state as “a public com-
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munity based explicitly in reason and aiming at collective or uni-
versal ends” and the family life as the “private society based on 
love.”4 This comprises an early articulation of the gendered divi-
sion of rationality and emotionality. Wood’s analysis of Hegel’s 
Philosophy of Right indicates that the gendered division of ethics 
that I am proposing arises in the Phenomenology persisted 
throughout Hegel’s later works.  
 According to Hegel’s Phenomenology, the realm of Spirit is 
further divided into two distinct sets of laws: the human law and 
the divine law. In an analysis of Hegel’s text, Stephen Houlgate 
(2012) describes Hegel’s “human law” as being the law of univer-
sality, which governs the lives of individuals and allows them to 
live together in a community or state. The “divine law”, on the 
other hand, manifests in the family, and is the law that binds the 
family together and structures familial life. He describes this di-
vine law in opposition to human law, in that the divine law is the 
law of individuality.5 While both sets of laws are aspects of the 
ethical sphere, they are presented as conflicting, dichotomous 
opposites, which are linked to the two “natural sexes.” The hu-
man law is tied to “man” while the divine law is associated with 
“woman.”  
As I will show, the two sets of laws that Hegel articulates 
are not only in binary opposition, but they are also assigned une-
qual value. The law of man, the human law, is valued above the 
family law of women. As such, men seek to “overcome” the fam-
ily in order to participate in the life of the state. The woman is 
never able to similarly overcome family life, and as such is per-
manently tied to the obligations of divine law and caring for the 
needs of the family. Through this division of the ethical realm 
into the two categories of the state and the family, each with their 
own corresponding laws, Hegel is articulating an ethical divide 
between the genders, ascribing different meanings, roles, and 
responsibilities to each. 
 It is important to note the unequal value ascribed to each 
gender in Hegel’s division of the ethical realm. Men, who are 
able to participate in the state (human law) must aim to over-
come or supersede the family life. This can be observed in para-
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graphs 458-9 of the Phenomenology in which Hegel describes the 
Brother’s goal to leave the Family. Hegel explains this overcom-
ing of the family by the masculine-gendered brother in the fol-
lowing way:  
The brother is the member of the family in whom its Spir-
it becomes an individuality which turns towards another 
sphere, and passes over into the consciousness of univer-
sality. The brother leaves this immediate, elemental, and 
therefore negative ethical life of the family, in order to 
acquire and produce the ethical life that is conscious of 
itself and actual. He passes from the divine law, within 
whose sphere he lived, over to the human law.6 
Hegel uses phrases such as “passes over” to describe the broth-
er’s movement beyond the family into something that is more 
positive and universal, the state. The women, however, are left to 
attend to the divine law; “But the sister becomes, or the wife re-
mains, the head of the household and the guardian of the divine 
law.”7 Note that Hegel describes the divine law as negative and 
inconsistent with universality. Women, in Hegel’s story, cannot 
abandon family life in the way that men can-- they are tied to the 
divine law, while the human law is out of their reach.  
Also of interest is how Hegel describes men and women’s 
relationship to the ethical life inhabited by the other gender. He-
gel describes the two sets of laws as being in conflict, with each 
wanting to assert itself over the other. Note, however, that wom-
en’s resistance and desire to exert their law over the law of man 
is futile, because Hegel’s story renders her unable to overcome 
the domestic sphere. Hegel attributes the conflicting nature of 
the two sets of law to the idea that, “since it sees right only on 
one side and wrong on the other, that consciousness which be-
longs to the divine law sees in the other side only the violence of 
human caprice, while that which holds to human law sees in the 
other only the self-will and disobedience of the individual who 
insists on being his own authority.”8 Each sees its own law as 
being the “right” or more important law, notices only the nega-
tive qualities of the other, and thus fails to acknowledge the mer-
its of the other’s ethical system. Stephen Houlgate’s analysis de-
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scribes this as follows: “These laws are set against one another 
because the man and the woman also take their allegiance to 
their respective laws to be immediate and exclusive. Each acts, 
therefore, to make his or her own law the whole law and so seeks 
to subject the other’s law to his or her own.”9 Given this analysis, 
not only is Hegel setting up a theory of gender difference, in 
which men and women necessarily occupy different spheres 
with different governing principles and ethical accounts, but 
these ways of thinking are also described as being in conflict and 
seemingly irreconcilable.  
These ideas from the Phenomenology of Spirit have con-
tinued to be adapted and incorporated into more contemporary 
thought. For example, this distinction between ethical systems 
(human law and divine law) and their respective attribution to 
men and women seems to influence the more recent conception 
of the gendered ethical systems of Ethics of Care and Ethics of 
Justice. Robert White (2009) describes this distinction, famously 
articulated by Carol Gilligan, in which women are thought to use 
different moral reasoning than men, which is grounded in an 
ethic of care as opposed to an ethic of justice typically employed 
by men. White further describes the development of this distinc-
tion as understood by Nel Noddings, who contrasted the 
“mother’s voice” of care with the “language of the father,” which 
she argues is found in justice.10 This contemporary notion that 
men and women have distinct ethical systems grounded in dif-
ferent ways of thinking can be traced back to Hegel.  
I take this gendered division of ethical spheres to be prob-
lematic, insofar as it reinforces artificial differences in how men 
and women think and reason morally. The reality is that all peo-
ple are, or at least have the capacity to be, concerned with care 
and justice, or, in Hegelian terms, to be governed by both divine 
and human law. In other words, men and women do not adhere 
to one ethical sphere exclusively; this conception is surely over-
simplified. Rather, men and women alike must strive to achieve 
a balance in navigating both familial obligations and obligations 
of the state. This aspect of Hegel’s understanding of gender 
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needs to be critically reevaluated, especially in light of more re-
cent developments in gender theory. 
 The distinction between human law and divine law that 
Hegel articulates in the Phenomenology, is most clearly repre-
sented in his analysis of the play Antigone. The play tells the sto-
ry of Antigone, the sister of Eteocles and Polyneices, two broth-
ers who die fighting each other in a civil war in Thebes. The new 
ruler of Thebes, Creon, determines that Eteocles, whom he re-
gards as the noble brother, but not Polyneices, will be honored 
with holy burial rites. Despite Creon’s orders, Antigone feels that 
her familial duty as Polyneices’ sister compels her to give Poly-
neices a proper burial. Despite the fact that her sister, Ismene, 
refuses to help Antigone out of fear of the repercussions of the 
state, Antigone proceeds to honor her brother. Consequently, 
Creon sentences her to be punished for disobeying his decree. In 
the end, Antigone takes her own life.  
Hegel views this story as demonstrating the division of 
the ethical realm that he articulates in the Phenomenology of 
Spirit. Gallagher Laird quotes Hegel’s own description of Antig-
one, which states: 
Everything in this tragedy is logical; the public law of the 
state is set in conflict over against inner family love and 
duty to a brother; the woman, Antigone has the family 
interest as her ‘pathos,’ Creon, the man, has the welfare of 
the community as his. Polyneices, at war with his native 
city, has fallen before the gates of Thebes and Creon, the 
ruler, in a publicly proclaimed law threatened with death 
anyone who gave the honour of burial. But this com-
mand, which concerned only the public weal, Antigone 
could not accept; as sister, in the piety of her love for her 
brother, she fulfills the holy duty of burial. In doing so, 
she appeals to the laws of the gods; but the gods for 
whom she worships are the underworld gods of Hades, 
the inner gods of feeling, love, and kinship, not the day-
light gods of free self-conscious national and political 
life.’11 
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For Hegel, the conflict between Creon and Antigone lies in their 
adherence to two conflicting systems of laws, human and divine 
law respectively. Creon, as a man and ruler, embodies the hu-
man law, being committed to upholding the law and the sanctity 
of the state. In contrast, Antigone represents divine law, under 
which obligations to the family take precedence over laws of the 
state. Antigone’s main priority is upholding her familial duty as 
a sister to bury her brother, even at the risk of undermining the 
authority of the state.  
Hegel presents the conflict as a failure on Antigone and 
Creon’s part to recognize the value in each other’s ways of think-
ing. Creon is unable to see the importance of Antigone’s family-
centered virtues, or why it is so important for her to uphold her 
brother’s honor. He is unable to see that Antigone has been de-
fined by her role as a woman and sister, and that she can not 
help but desire to fulfill her obligations to the family sphere. 
Likewise, Antigone so strongly desires to fulfill her familial du-
ties that she is unable to respect the role that Creon must play in 
upholding the universal laws of the state (though I am inclined 
to believe that she is justified in her defiance). Creon is defined 
by his role in society, and must act to uphold human law, even 
when it means undermining the importance of familial roles and 
obligations. For each, they are acting out duties that were de-
fined for them by their respective “spheres,” which have become 
central to their identities. As such, they fail to achieve mutual 
recognition of the value of each other’s ethical systems, and the 
result is tragedy. Gallagher (2011) quotes Hegel’s understanding 
of this one-sidedness:  
‘…if the one-sidedness of a ‘pathos’ is the real 
ground of the collisions, this can only mean that it 
is carried out into actually living action, and the 
one-sided ‘pathos’ has become the one and only 
‘pathos’ of a specific individual. Now if the one-
sidedness is to be cancelled, it is the individual, 
since he has acted solely as this one ‘pathos’ who 
must be got rid of and sacrificed. For the individu-
al is only this one life and, if this is not to prevail 
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on its own account as this one, the individual 
must be shattered. This sort of development is 
most complete when the individuals who are at 
variance appear each of them in their concrete ex-
istence as a totality, so that they are in the power 
of what they are fighting, and therefore violate 
what, if they were true to their own nature, they 
should be honouring. […] there is immanent in 
both Creon and Antigone something that in their 
own way they attack, so that they are gripped and 
shattered by something intrinsic to their own ac-
tual being.’12 
Antigone illustrates how strict, one-sided adherence to a single 
ethical code can lead to an overwhelming devotion that ultimate-
ly ends in tragedy. Hegel’s interpretation suggests that Antigo-
ne’s failure to recognize the value and authority of the state leads 
to her demise, demonstrating his preference for the masculine 
ethical system over the one ascribed to women. 
 Sophocles’ play Antigone helps to highlight the problems 
of such rigid and fixed roles, and how they will result in conflicts 
that can’t be overcome unless mutual recognition is somehow 
achieved. This story, which Hegel is using as an example of this 
gendered division of responsibilities between the family and the 
state, actually shows how problematic this very division is. If the 
story were such that Creon and Antigone represented more of a 
balance, and both were able to see the value of human and divine 
laws, it would have been easier for each to understand the com-
mitments of the other, and the tragic ending likely could have 
been avoided. (Of course, the story was intended to validate so-
cial norms of the time, social norms that were adopted by Hegel 
and are still reproduced today, and Sophocles’ likely would not 
have told the story otherwise.  What is important is how Hegel 
uses the play to illustrate his distinction, and the normative val-
ues that he implicitly supports.) 
 While I argue that Hegel seems to be establishing this sys-
tem of gender difference and reinforcing it using Sophocles’ An-
tigone, other interpretations are also possible, and it is unclear by 
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reading the Phenomenology of Spirit alone which interpretation 
is correct. Molly Farneth has a more charitable view of the 
“Ethical Order” section of the Phenomenology. On her analysis, 
Hegel is using the story of Antigone not to reinforce these gen-
dered distinctions, but to criticize them and show them to be 
problematic. Her interpretation states that, “Hegel is condemn-
ing social arrangements that take the authoritativeness of identi-
ties and obligations to be natural or merely given. Hegel criti-
cizes the Greeks’ understanding of both the human law and the 
divine law; in doing so, he provides resources for a critique of 
essentialist approaches to sex and gender.”13 
 There has been a great deal of debate among scholars 
about how to interpret this section of the Phenomenology. The 
question raised is whether Hegel aims to promote a society di-
vided by strict gender roles as the ideal, reinforcing the essential-
ist views of gender, or if Hegel’s aim is to show that this gen-
dered view is problematic, and indeed tragic, as Farneth sug-
gests. Other scholars, including Robert Brandom, who also sug-
gests that Hegel is critiquing this story of gender division and 
essentialism, join Farneth in her defense of Hegel. On the other 
hand, scholars including Seyla Benhabib, Luce Irigaray, Lynda 
Lange, Particia Mills, Carole Pateman, and Judith Butler,14 argue 
that Hegel is perpetuating and promoting gender essentialism, 
celebrating the ancient societies that were structured around this 
division.15 Given my engagement with this section within the 
Phenomenology of Spirit overall, I take Hegel to be enforcing the 
naturalized gender roles and celebrating the ancient Greek state.  
Hegel’s project is to show how consciousness can come to 
find itself at home in the world, and thus Hegel seems to be sug-
gesting that the Greek model of the ethical life is the best system 
to accomplish this and avoid feelings of alienation. Hegel’s dis-
cussion of consciousness arrives at a search for connection in the 
social world, because attempts to find itself in modern individu-
alism (reason) fail up to that point. Consciousness moves onto 
the social realm, and is now “the individual that is a world.”16 If 
the goal of consciousness at this point is to avoid feeling alienat-
ed, and to find itself at home in the social world, it seems as if 
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Hegel is suggesting that the ideal social form for this was the an-
cient Greek state. Hegel viewed the ancient Greek society as har-
monious and effective at allowing multiple consciousnesses to 
feel at home in the world simultaneously. However, he is also 
suggests that emphasis on reason and individualism prevent this 
type of state from actualizing in the modern world. Given He-
gel’s emphasis on a harmonious social order, and his descrip-
tions of gender and family/state life, I am not convinced that He-
gel is using this section to critique a natural division of gender. 
Rather, such a division seems to be exactly what he is describing 
and endorsing in this section.  
 In an interesting article on the process of naturalization of 
race and gender, Susanne Lettow describes how 18th and early 
19th century Philosophers contributed to the knowledge base 
that allowed for these theories of race and gender as “natural.” 
She analyzes the writings of Kant, Schelling, and Hegel to show 
how their writings contribute to underlying assumptions about 
“natural” biological differences in race and gender. Lettow ar-
gues that for Hegel, as with Schelling, “sexual difference is a core 
characteristic of organic nature in general.”17 The following is 
Lettow’s articulation of Hegel’s conception of sexual difference:  
 According to Hegel, the organic is charac-
terized by ‘the direction of this whole into op-
posed, self-subsistent sexes; the sublation of the 
individual and the resultant being of the genus, 
but of the genus as an individual actual being 
which initiates the cycle again’. Each organism is 
thus comprised of a process in which it refers to 
itself (i.e. the process of formation), a process of 
assimilation in which it refers to the other as 
something inorganic, and, finally, the process of 
the species in which it refers to the other as a liv-
ing individual. This theory of organic nature is 
then further developed according to Hegel’s mod-
el of stages that eventually leads to an overcoming 
of nature in favour of the spirit.  Although 
‘the truly organic form of life begins merely with 
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plant nature because it is (in contrast to geological 
nature) characterized by reproduction, sexual dif-
ference, in the proper sense of the word, belongs 
only to the stage of animal nature. Only here does 
one find a ‘veritable separation of the sides of the 
opposition in the sex-relation.18 
Further, Lettow points out Hegel’s understanding of how gender 
is tied to sex. She references the anthropological understandings 
of sex and gender at the time Hegel was writing, stating, “the 
body became understood as the embodiment of gender, so that 
every part of it expressed the sexual identity of the individual.”  
She argues that Hegel’s own work very closely aligns with this 
understanding of sex and gender. She gives the example of He-
gel’s understanding that sex difference is “not only about the re-
productive organs” but rather “the entire habit of the individual 
must be bound up with its sex.” Bodily differences, for Hegel, are 
seen as having an impact on the entire personality and lifestyle 
of the individual. Again, Lettow quotes Hegel: “Through the 
male and female natures, there emerges a determination of the 
entire structure, a different habitus which also extends to the 
spiritual sphere and becomes a distinct natural feature.”  
Hegel’s own words, as well as the analysis provided by 
Lettow, suggest that Hegel’s view is that of naturalized sex and 
gender. Hegel took sex to be a product of natural differences 
with gender differences closely linked to differences in sex. With 
this articulation of Hegel’s understanding of the naturalism and 
essentialism of sex and gender, Farneth’s argument that Hegel is 
using the story of Antigone to critique gender essentialism19 
seems implausible. While Hegel’s text could certainly be used by 
other scholars to allude to the problems of gender essentialism, 
specifically as represented by the tragic outcome of Antigone, 
this does not seem to be the idea that is put forth by Hegel. Given 
the history of Hegel’s own understanding of the naturalism of 
gender difference, it is more plausible that Hegel is perpetuating 
gender essentialism in the “Ethical Order” section of the Phe-
nomenology of Spirit than critiquing it. Even if Hegel did not ex-
plicitly intend to perpetuate these essentialist views of gender, 
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his work certainly ends up reading this way, and the result is an 
implicit perpetuation of naturalized sex differences and subse-
quent gender differences.  
 Despite the possibility that Hegel’s perpetuation of a the-
ory of gender difference is not intentional, but merely implied by 
the context of his work, some scholars would argue that his artic-
ulation of gender difference is both intentional and explicit, and 
can be supported by examining Hegel’s other works. In her arti-
cle titled “‘That which is Different From Difference is Identity’- 
Hegel on Gender,” Laura Werner (2006) provides a comprehen-
sive account of why she takes Hegel to be articulating and en-
dorsing a theory of essential and natural gender difference. She 
argues that Hegel constructs a theory of gender difference that is 
apparent in Hegel’s natural philosophy, in which Hegel de-
scribes differences between male and female bodies, and in his 
philosophy of social life, in which he describes differentiated 
spheres of action for men and women. The female body connects 
the woman to a position in the domestic sphere of action, while 
the male body positions the man as a citizen and participant in 
the state. Werner argues that throughout Hegel’s Phenomenolo-
gy of Spirit, he builds this distinction up by “two separate but 
interconnected ‘differences’ that function on two separate levels 
of ‘realness’ he distinguishes in his thought, Wirklichkeit 
(‘actuality’) and Realitat (‘reality’).”20 She explains this by argu-
ing that Hegel constructs gender difference conceptually first by 
positing “actual” differences between men and women at the 
level of the absolute spirit. Then, he posits “real” or “concrete” 
differences at the everyday level of lived experiences, which are 
based on the more primary “actual” differences. She argues that 
the “actual” differences are conceptual, based on the self-
movement of spirit. The “real” or “concrete” differences are 
those that Hegel ascribes to men and women in the embodied 
experiences of everyday social and political life. 21 
This is to say that Hegel constructs gender difference 
throughout the Phenomenology first through a “conceptual, ac-
tual difference, regarding ‘difference’ itself and self-
differentiation, and secondly through concrete differences result-
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ing from the first, actual difference.”22  He first gives us conceptu-
al categories of “men” and “women” and then gives concrete dif-
ferences between those categories, such as the gendered spheres 
of action that we see in the “Ethical Order” section and manifest-
ed in the story of Antigone. Werner’s essay provides an analysis 
of Hegel’s conception of gender difference that supports my 
claim that his presentation of the story of Antigone is not an ef-
fort to criticize it, but an effort to reinforce gender normative 
roles as presented in the play. 
 Another interpretation that supports my claim that He-
gel’s use of the play Antigone reinforces gender normative un-
derstandings of men and women is presented by Kelly Oliver in 
the article “Antigone’s Ghost: Undoing Hegel’s Phenomenology 
of Spirit.” In the piece, Oliver argues that “woman” gets left be-
hind as the “unconsciousness of the family upon which all subse-
quent dialectical movements of the conceptualization of Spirit 
rest; she is never resuscitated or preserved in the later stages of 
the dialectical movement of consciousness. She is the spirit be-
hind the Spirit, the ghost that haunts Hegel’s Phenomenology.”23 
She gives an example of this by noting that the individual who is 
able to move into culture through the operation of the family is 
always only the male, while the individual doing the necessary 
work in the family that allows the movement of the other into 
culture is always the female. In the male’s movement into the 
universality of the state, the feminine virtue of individuality and 
the family are sublated and left behind. This represents a nega-
tion of the feminine in order for the male to move forward into 
society. She states that,  
…unlike the master or slave, the feminine or woman does 
not contain the dormant seed of its opposite. Rather, the 
masculine or man comes to conscious articulation against 
the feminine, which he necessarily leaves behind. Where-
as the slave triumphs through his work and preserves the 
mastery of the master, woman’s work leaves her no-
where.... At the level of the ethical order, man triumphs 
through woman’s work. How is it that she who works is 
left behind?24 
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Oliver argues that not only is Hegel reifying this difference, but 
that the masculine is valued above the feminine, whose work in 
promoting the male into civil life is left behind, and whose im-
portance is never recognized in the way that the centrality of the 
slave’s labor is recognized as vital to the mastery of the master. 
In the “Ethical Order” section, Hegel not only articulates an ac-
count of gender differences and a division of labor into different 
spheres, but he attributes unequal importance to the work of 
these spheres, undermining the centrality of the woman’s role in 
the family that allows men to “overcome” the family and enter 
society. 
 Despite the fact that there is significant reason to believe 
that Hegel’s text is perpetuating a naturalization of gender differ-
ence and a gender essentialist theory of the division of labor and 
responsibility, the “Ethical Order” passage of the Phenomenolo-
gy of Spirit is nonetheless useful for feminist interpretation. 
There is a great deal that can be critiqued in the passage, but also 
a great deal that can be learned from it. In Oliver’s piece, she 
questions what can be learned from the “Ethical Order” section, 
and responds that the section can shed light on how we conceive 
of and construct a sense of “family values.” She states, “For He-
gel, the personal or domestic sphere is the antithesis of the politi-
cal sphere; and yet, the political sphere is dependent on the do-
mestic sphere. The domestic nurtures and protects the politi-
cal.”25 Oliver argues that throughout the 1960s and 1970s, this 
view resurfaced as the “breakdown of the nuclear family” was 
blamed as the source of increasing problems in the community, 
such a crime, domestic violence, and poverty. She argues that 
this one way view of the family’s role in nurturing the communi-
ty, which was presented by Hegel in the “Ethical Order” section 
of the Phenomenology, still holds, such that when the communi-
ty breaks down, the family unit is blamed.  
The problem, Oliver suggests, is that this view is seen as 
causal in only one direction. Emphasis is put on the centrality of 
the family’s impact on the community- the essentiality of “family 
values” in keeping the community structure in place. What goes 
unnoticed is the other direction- the role that the state and com-
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munity should have in supporting and nurturing the family. In-
stead of understanding how this could work in both directions, 
with the family and the community supporting each other, politi-
cians of the 1960s and 70s, much like Hegel, only saw the fami-
ly’s role in supporting the community. If politicians, following in 
the tradition Hegel establishes in the Phenomenology, are con-
cerned with upholding “family values” that nurture and support 
the community, Oliver questions why the community/state is 
not concerned with aiding the family such that the family struc-
ture can be supported and those “family values” can be main-
tained.  Oliver suggests that the community could aid the family 
through welfare services, government childcare services, educa-
tion, summer programs, health care services, and food services. 
Oliver argues that the very same politicians who ground their 
campaigns on “family values,” perpetuating the underlying as-
sumption that strong family values will be the most effective 
way in remedying the problems of the state, fail to see the im-
portance of the state’s ability to support the family unit.  
Oliver’s analysis reflects both how Hegel failed to see the 
importance of bidirectional support of the family and communi-
ty, focusing only on the role of the domestic sphere in supporting 
the public sphere, and also how that mentality continues to man-
ifest today. This demonstrates that Hegel can be analyzed to gain 
insight into current issues. Hegel’s texts can show us how disas-
trous essentialist views of gender can be, especially when cou-
pled with a lack of the ability to equally appreciate differing ethi-
cal systems. Additionally, we may consider the tragedy that re-
sults from pitting these gendered ethical systems against each 
other, and begin to consider the ways in which concern for the 
community and the family ought to be ethical concerns of men 
and women alike. Considering the shortcomings of Hegel’s gen-
dered view can set the stage for more productive and compre-
hensive understandings of ethical life.  
 Throughout the course of this paper, I have argued that 
despite the disagreement about how to interpret the “Ethical Or-
der” section of Hegel’s text, the most convincing interpretation is 
one that views the section as promoting gender essentialism and 
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naturalism of gender. This view is supported by Hegel’s own 
descriptions of his understanding of Sophocles’ play Antigone, 
as well as some of his other work on natural philosophy and bio-
logical difference. Additionally, other scholars have provided 
convincing arguments why this is the most appropriate reading, 
given more comprehensive understandings of Hegel’s philo-
sophical works other than the Phenomenology. Although He-
gel’s text seems to be perpetuating a theory of gender difference, 
it is still of use to feminist scholars. In fact, the section provides a 
great deal of space for criticism and analysis. One particularly 
useful point of analysis is brought to light by Kelly Oliver, who 
points out the problem with Hegel’s conception of the family 
unit as a central system of support for the public sphere, but this 
support is not reciprocated by the latter. Using Hegel’s work as a 
starting point for considering civil gender issues can help bring 
them to light and provide a basis for new ways of thinking about 
them, just as Oliver was able to expand Hegel’s work and consid-
er how it might be useful to think of the relationship between the 
family and the state in a new way. However, it is important to 
note that for this argument to satisfy contemporary understand-
ings of feminist issues, it is first necessary to decouple these ethi-
cal spheres from gender, and think about the ways in which men 
and women alike play a role in both the family and the state, and 
thus have obligations to both human and divine law.  
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